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The United States has done more than any other country to define the contours 
of contemporary international politics. Yet America’s ability to continue shaping 
the international landscape is increasingly doubted by foreign policy analysts. 
In this article, we contribute to the discussion over America’s future global role 
by arguing that the debate has suffered from an almost exclusive focus on the 
concept of relative power—that is, the balance of material capabilities between 
the United States and its potential peer competitors. From this international-
level vantage-point, understanding America’s ability to effect meaningful change 
abroad is primarily a question of whether it is losing geopolitical ground to rising 
and resurgent powers such as China and Russia and, if so, how it should adjust its 
international commitments and force posture.
We challenge this approach. We argue here that the question of US decline 
is best understood in terms of the ‘usable power’ available to foreign policy 
decision-makers.1 While not dismissing the significance of external constraints 
on US power, we suggest that the most immediate challenges facing the United 
States when it comes to exercising international leadership today come not from 
foreign challengers or the size of the US arsenal, but rather from domestic politics. 
Indeed, on matters ranging from nuclear proliferation to international trade to 
climate change, it is already the case that US leadership on the world stage has 
been constrained by fractious domestic politics, even though almost all analysts 
agree that on the international stage the United States at present faces no peer 
competitor.2 The focus on relative power obscures this essential point.
We identify three interrelated factors that have weakened US leaders’ ability to 
act programmatically in foreign policy—that is, in accordance with a coherent and 
overarching policy programme: (1) the rise of hyper-partisanship in Washington, 
which erodes public confidence in the president and reduces the ability of the 
1 The phrase ‘usable power’ was first used by Stanley Hoffmann. See his ‘Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the 
nation-state and the case of Western Europe’, Daedalus 95: 3, Summer 1966, pp. 862–915, and ‘A view from at 
home: the perils of incoherence’, Foreign Affairs 57: 3, 1978, p. 474.
2 Even China’s potential to rival the US should not be overstated. See Thomas J. Christensen, The China chal-
lenge: shaping the choices of a rising power (New York: W.W. Norton, 2015); Xiaoyu Pu and Chengli Wang, 
‘Rethinking China’s rise: Chinese scholars debate strategic overstretch’, International Affairs 94: 6, Sept. 2018, 
pp. 1019–36; David Shambaugh, China goes global: the partial power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); 
Susan Shirk, The fragile superpower: how China’s internal politics could derail its peaceful rise (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2007).
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executive branch to convey resolve to friends and adversaries alike; (2) the absence 
of a compelling foreign policy narrative, which makes it hard to mobilize disparate 
domestic constituencies around a shared vision of US international purpose; and (3) 
the erosion of the domestic social contract and the increasing vulnerability of work-
ing Americans to the changes wrought by globalization and trade liberalization, 
which have raised the costs to politicians of pursuing an internationalist foreign 
policy. America’s divided constitutional order allows programmatic and sustained 
foreign policy initiatives to succeed and endure only when they are underwritten 
by bipartisanship and support from a broad cross-section of the voting public. The 
three developments in US politics outlined above, the interrelationships of which 
have been explored in literatures on US politics and social policy since the 1980s, 
have had the combined effect of eroding that domestic political base.
While the waning of America’s usable power is most evident today in the 
collapse of support for liberal internationalism,3 we argue that US leaders 
who prefer alternative grand strategies will also find it difficult to implement a 
coherent foreign policy agenda so long as domestic-level dysfunction in the form 
of fractious politics goes unattended. This, we contend, is already evident in the 
case of Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ strategy; but other programmatic strate-
gies proposed today, such as ‘offshore balancing’ and ‘strategic restraint’, would 
encounter similar difficulties.4 This is because these strategic responses address only 
the international side of the problem—that is, America’s international commit-
ments and forward presence. Yet, as we argue here, America’s ability to sustain 
even a much reduced geopolitical footprint will require wide domestic support 
that is rooted in a new domestic contract with those whom US foreign policy is 
ostensibly meant to serve and protect: the American people.
The article is organized as follows. First, we sketch out the debate among 
International Relations (IR) scholars between the so-called declinists and anti-
declinists, who argue over whether the United States is in decline owing to a loss 
of relative power. We suggest that this is the wrong question. The right question 
is how much usable power US leaders have at their disposal, and whether such 
power can be harnessed to programmatic policies. In the second part, we develop 
the argument that usable power is largely a function of domestic-level factors. 
We argue that the relationship between usable power and domestic politics is 
threefold: it lies in the link between bipartisanship and credible commitments, 
the effects of the presence or absence of popular mobilization around a common 
foreign policy purpose, and the connection between public support for foreign 
policy and the domestic distributive and redistributive effects thereof.
This argument rests on theoretical and empirical support from the IR and 
foreign policy literatures, as well as work on the politics of US foreign policy-
making and the political and economic geography of US domestic politics. We 
use both historical case material and quantitative data on inequality in the United 
3 Joseph S. Nye, Jr, ‘The rise and fall of American hegemony from Wilson to Trump’, International Affairs 95: 1, 
Jan. 2019, pp. 63–80.
4 Peter Dombrowski and Simon Reich, ‘Does Donald Trump have a grand strategy?’, International Affairs 93: 3, 
Sept. 2017, pp. 1013–38.
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States, patterns of US economic globalization, party polarization in Congress and 
public trust in Washington. Finally, we discuss the implications of our analysis 
for restoring America’s usable power. We briefly consider two possible strategic 
responses: international retrenchment and domestic renewal. We argue that a 
strategy of renewal holds greater promise for addressing the shortfall in America’s 
usable power and bringing ends and means into better balance.
The ‘relative power’ debate over America’s decline
Few analysts dispute that the ongoing rise and resurgence of powers such as China, 
Russia and India will have dramatic implications for international politics in the 
twenty-first century.5 Yet there is substantial disagreement over just what these 
implications will be for the future of US leadership. Will shifts in the international 
distribution of power choke off US freedom of action abroad, or will America 
retain the capacity to act programmatically in foreign policy? Some IR scholars 
argue that if the United States can bolster the amount of material power at its 
disposal, or apply its existing power using more efficient military and diplomatic 
strategies (e.g. ‘offshore balancing’ or ‘strategic restraint’), then it will be able to 
compensate for relative gains made by other states.6 Others insist that there is 
more than enough potential power at America’s disposal to maintain international 
preponderance, provided the country’s leaders do not invest it unwisely in the 
pursuit of unattainable goals.7
Both camps focus on America’s comparative position vis-à-vis other (would-be) 
Great Powers. In this debate, the things that matter are (a) the size of the gap in 
power (or in purpose) between the United States and its geopolitical competitors 
and (b) whether that gap can be most effectively dealt with by adjusting commit-
ments or by clarifying strategic goals.8 Such arguments share a common short-
coming: they overlook the domestic-level factors that might prevent the United 
States from exercising influence in world politics regardless of its relative power position. 
Whether America’s leaders can boost national power or check potential competi-
tors does not depend only on US power assets relative to those of other countries. 
Rather, the capability to act programmatically in foreign policy also depends 
greatly on the country’s usable power—that is, its domestic political capacity to 
translate those power assets into international influence.9
5 Yuen Foong Khong, ‘Power as prestige in world politics’, International Affairs 95: 1, Jan. 2019, pp. 119–42; Wu 
Xinbo, ‘China in search of a liberal partnership international order’, International Affairs 94: 6, Sept. 2018, pp. 
995–1018.
6 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, ‘The case for offshore balancing’, Foreign Affairs 95: 4, July–Aug. 
2016, pp. 70–83; Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press and Harvey M. Sapolsky, ‘Come home America: the strategy 
of restraint in the face of temptation’, International Security 21: 4, Spring 1997, pp. 5–48; Barry R. Posen, 
Restraint: a new foundation for US grand strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).
7 See Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, America abroad: the United States’ global role in the 21st century 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
8 See e.g. Christopher Layne, ‘The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana’, International 
Affairs 94: 1, Jan. 2018, pp. 89–111.
9 For a pessimistic take on the capacity of US political institutions to bring coherence to foreign policy, see 
Dombrowski and Reich, ‘Does Donald Trump have a grand strategy?’.
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The concept of usable power was first put forward by Stanley Hoffman, who 
distinguished between ‘available, usable, and effective power’.10 Whereas ‘available 
power’ refers to the latent (potential) power at a state’s disposal, ‘usable power’ 
refers only to those resources that can actually be mobilized, given domestic 
constraints.11 Hoffman’s insight that domestic-level factors can detract from a 
leader’s ability to muster national resources animates a strain of IR scholarship 
that discusses how domestic-level variables shape statecraft.12 Francis Fukuyama, 
for example, captured the notion of ‘usable power’ in his idea of a nation’s polit-
ical ‘discount rate’, or the difference between a nation’s relative power and its 
institutional capacity to act. Fukuyama defined the latter as ‘state strength’, which 
in turn is determined by the extent of centralization of its political institutions.13 
He argued that highly centralized China had a lower discount rate (that is, could 
act more quickly and ‘cheaply’ in terms of domestic political cost) in the foreign 
policy domain than the United States, which is constrained by its fragmented 
institutions and the separation of powers. In what follows, we expand this point 
to argue that in the American case, usable power is influenced by both institutional 
and non-institutional features of domestic politics.
Domestic politics and usable power
Domestic political processes can both impede (weaken) and facilitate (strengthen) 
the exercise of American power abroad. The first of these effects has been well 
documented by IR scholars, but the second can be just as important.14 That is, 
domestic politics can act as a force multiplier—domestic political factors can 
strengthen a leader’s ability to project power and influence in a programmatic 
fashion. We develop this argument here. We conceptualize the usable power at a 
president’s disposal as a function of the extent to which his policies enjoy congres-
sional support, set the parameters of the national debate over foreign policy and 
are economically inclusive. We argue that presidents have historically relied upon 
three closely related tools to mobilize these sources of usable power in the foreign 
policy domain: bipartisanship, heresthetics and (re)distributive politics.15 We draw 
10 Hoffmann, ‘A view from at home’, p. 474. See also Hoffmann, ‘Obstinate or obsolete?’.
11 Hoffmann used the concept of ‘effective power’ to draw attention to international-level impediments to 
influencing others’ behaviour.
12 This is particularly true of neo-classical realist scholarship. For representative examples, see Randall 
L. Schweller, Unanswered threats: political constraints on the balance of power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2006); Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, eds, Neoclassical realism, the state, and 
foreign policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Fareed Zakaria, From wealth to power: the unusual 
origins of America’s world role (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
13 Francis Fukuyama, ‘The domestic basis of American power’, Lawfare, 9 March 2014, https://www.lawfare-
blog.com/foreign-policy-essay-domestic-basis-american-power. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, 
all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 14 March 2018.)
14 In addition to the scholarship noted above (in n. 12), see George F. Kennan, American diplomacy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2012; first publ. 1951), p. 190; Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the national interest: 
raw materials investments and US foreign policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); John Mearsheimer 
and Stephen Walt, The Israel lobby and US foreign policy (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2007).
15 Presidents are successful when they can wield these three tools to build support for a programmatic foreign 
policy among the political elite and the general public. Bipartisanship, heresthetics and redistributive politics 
are interdependent strategies for strengthening a president’s hand in foreign policy. The term heresthetics is 
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on clearly observable contrasts between Cold War and post-Cold War foreign 
policy-making to track the declining role and effectiveness of these domestic- 
political tools and resources of American statecraft.16 In developing these 
arguments, we draw upon research by IR and foreign policy scholars, as well as 
work on party politics, public opinion and the effects of economic globalization.
Bipartisanship, credibility and credible commitment
George Washington’s farewell address of 1796 is remembered for its admonition to 
‘steer clear of permanent alliances’. Yet Washington’s message conveyed a second 
warning, too: that partisanship at home invites trouble abroad. Washington wrote 
at a time when overseas events threatened to destroy the Republic. Although 
presidents today do not worry about foreign coercion to the same extent, they 
have shared Washington’s view that in foreign affairs, bipartisanship is preferable 
to partisanship. One important reason for this is that bipartisanship enhances 
presidents’ credibility and, by extension, their capacity to exert influence abroad.17
Both foreigners and US citizens have reason to worry about the ramifications 
of partisan rivalry and party turnover for US commitments. Foreign leaders 
worry that any proposed change in US strategy that is favourable to their inter-
ests might be reversed or soft-pedalled if (when) the opposing party gains control 
of the White House. To assuage such fears, presidents have historically employed 
various means to bolster the credibility of their foreign policy decisions. Biparti-
sanship is one tool for doing so.18 Efforts to build consensus across party lines may 
involve appeasement, concessions, power-sharing, splitting the opposition, tying 
of hands, logrolls or the appointment of opposition politicians to cabinet-level 
positions. Most commonly, efforts at bipartisanship involve policy concessions to 
the opposing party, moves that help to alleviate fears of foreign policy inconsis-
tency by signalling that the president’s commitment is likely to endure even if the 
president’s party loses office.19
A substantial literature on public opinion shows that domestic voters also find 
bipartisanship reassuring.20 While US voters are prepared to grant presidents wide 
closely associated with William Riker.  See William H. Riker, The art of political manipulation (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1986).
16 In the process, we find little evidence that alternative domestic-level explanations—a president’s party affili-
ation, the presence of unified or divided government, macroeconomic conditions, or presidential style and 
personality, for example—can account for the secular decline in programmatic foreign policy-making.
17 Bipartisanship is not a substitute for hard power or good policy judgement, but it does signal political purpose 
and enhances credibility. See Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The executive unbound: after the Madisonian 
Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
18 Embedding foreign policy decisions in multilateral agreements is another mechanism that can enhance cred-
ibility by raising the threshold for successful presidential action and raising the costs of defection or reneging. 
See Joseph M. Grieco, Christopher Gelpi, Jason Reifler and Peter D. Feaver, ‘Let’s get a second opinion: 
international institutions and American public support for war’, International Studies Quarterly 55: 2, June 2011, 
pp. 563–83. 
19 See Kenneth A. Schultz, ‘Perils of polarization for US foreign policy’, Washington Quarterly 40: 4, Oct. 2017, 
pp. 7–28. See also John Talton Lewis III, United Nation: bipartisanship as signaling in the fight for international 
institutions, Honors Thesis, Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin, May 2010.
20 See Celia Paris, ‘Breaking down bipartisanship: when and why citizens react to cooperation across party lines’, 
Public Opinion Quarterly 81: 2, Summer 2017, pp. 473–94; Brandon Rottinghaus and Kent L. Tedin, ‘Presiden-
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discretion in foreign affairs, especially during national security emergencies, they 
also worry about executive capriciousness and adventurism.21 Because they do 
not have access to reliable information to judge the likelihood of such negative 
outcomes, they rely on cues to gauge the president’s commitment and trustwor-
thiness. Bipartisanship is an especially valuable information cue because it signals 
that the president’s policies are not motivated by narrow partisan interest. Robison 
and Mullinix follow a long tradition of research showing that voters do not recoil 
from bipartisan messaging but rather respond positively to it, with voters on each 
side likely to follow the (bipartisan) policy endorsements put forward by their 
respective preferred parties.22
Bipartisanship also helps to commit the party that is not in power. When 
members of the opposing party sign up to the president’s policy, they are betting 
that the political benefits of sharing credit for the policy’s success will outweigh 
any political reward (in the form of, for example, media visibility or campaign 
donations) they might hope to gain from opposing the president. They also sacri-
fice a good deal of political flexibility. Signing up to the president’s strategy today 
makes it harder for opposition figures to switch to opposing it should the strategy 
prove to be unpopular tomorrow, or should they win power in the next election.
A classic example of bipartisanship from the early Cold War years is Harry 
Truman’s agreement to Republican demands that he limit the scope and duration 
of the Marshall Plan. By securing the support of key Republicans such as Arthur 
Vandenberg, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and once 
a leading voice on the isolationist wing of the Republican Party, Truman sought 
to reassure the nations of western Europe that the US programme to support 
European economic regeneration would not be subject to the vicissitudes of 
American politics. Meanwhile, by gaining the support of fiscally conservative 
Republicans such as the Senate Majority Leader, Robert Taft, Truman sent a 
reassuring signal to voters who worried about burdensome taxation, US economic 
imperialism and creeping ‘New Dealism’. Bipartisanship helped Truman enhance 
his credibility with both foreign and domestic publics.23
From 1945 to 1975 bipartisanship in US foreign policy was the norm. Repub-
lican presidents were able to exploit North–South divisions within the Democratic 
tial “going bipartisan” and the consequences for institutional approval’, American Behavioral Scientist 56: 12, 
Dec. 2012, pp. 1696–717; Laurel Harbridge and Neil Malhotra, ‘Electoral incentives and partisan conflict in 
Congress: evidence from survey experiments’, American Journal of Political Science 55: 3, July 2011, pp. 494–510. 
By contrast, voters seem to find partisan rhetoric to be alienating and off-putting. See Jonathan Morris and 
Marie Witting, ‘Congressional partisanship, bipartisanship and public opinion: an experimental analysis’, Poli-
tics and Policy 29: 1, March 2001, pp. 47–67.
21 These fears informed the public debate even during the Cold War, when Americans were more worried 
about national security than about executive power. See Michael J. Hogan, A cross of iron: Harry S. Truman 
and the origins of the national security state, 1945–1954 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Aaron L. 
Friedberg, In the shadow of the garrison state: America’s anti-statism and its Cold War strategy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000).
22 Joshua Robison and Kevin J. Mullinix, ‘Elite polarization and public opinion: how polarization is communi-
cated and its effects’, Political Communication 33: 2, April 2016, pp. 261–82.
23 See Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the reconstruction of western Europe, 1947–1952 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 381–2; Benjamin O. Fordham, Building the Cold War 
consensus: the political economy of US national security policy, 1949–1951 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1998).
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party over military spending to win substantial across-the-aisle support for their 
foreign policies, while Democratic presidents were able to exploit East–West 
divisions within the Republican Party over internationalism to build foreign 
policy coalitions that were strikingly bipartisan in character.24 This bipartisanship 
worked to stabilize the US grand strategy of liberal internationalism in the three 
decades after the end of the Second World War.
In recent decades, presidents have found it harder to fashion bipartisan 
compromises over foreign policy. As the two parties have become more inter-
nally homogeneous, unified and distinctive, and the moderate centre has become 
increasingly marginalized by the growing strength of the party extremes, parti-
sanship has intensified on Capitol Hill.25 According to one widely used measure of 
partisan polarization, the ideological distance between the parties has risen sharply 
since the early 1990s (see figure 1). As a result, members of Congress have had 
less incentive to publicly align themselves with the White House when it is held 
by the opposing party. This leaves presidents with much less political room for 
manoeuvre than they had during the Cold War. 
24 See Peter Trubowitz and Nicole Mellow, ‘Going bipartisan: politics by other means’, Political Science Quarterly 
120: 3, Fall 2005, pp. 433–53.
25 Michael Barber and Nolan McCarty, ‘Causes and consequences of polarization’, in Jane Mansbridge and 
Cathie Jo Martin, eds, Political negotiation: a handbook (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), pp. 
19–53.
Figure 1: Partisan polarization in Congress, 1945–2017
Note: The measure of partisan polarization (vertical axis) used here is DW-Nominate, which uses 
congressional roll-call votes to calculate the ideological distance between the two parties in a 
Euclidian space. The higher the score, the farther apart the parties are on policy matters.
Source: See Jeffrey B. Lewis, Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin and Luke 
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In Congress, party polarization has meant less bipartisan support for presi-
dential uses of military force and for international treaties negotiated by the 
White House.26 Party polarization has also been closely associated with the well-
documented decline in public trust in government. Figure 2 draws on public 
opinion data to show that, as partisanship has intensified in Washington, the credi-
bility of national leaders in the eyes of the public has declined. While a number 
of factors have contributed to the erosion of public confidence in Washington, a 
substantial body of political science research indicates that partisan polarization in 
Congress is not only a correlate of but also a contributor to this outcome.27 This 
extends to the foreign policy domain.
The collapse of bipartisanship in Washington has been accompanied not only 
by a decline in the perceived credibility of US leaders (including presidents) in the 
eyes of domestic audiences, but also by a decline in the credibility of US commit-
ments overseas. Recent presidents have bypassed legislative approval for even 
some of their most important and consequential foreign policy initiatives, relying 
26 Schultz, ‘Perils of polarization’.
27 See Marc Hetherington and Thomas J. Rudolph, Why Washington won’t work: polarization, political trust, and the 
governing crisis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015); David R. Jones, ‘Declining trust in Congress: 
effects of polarization and consequences for democracy’, The Forum 13: 3, Oct. 2015, pp. 375–94; Eric M. 
Uslaner, ‘Congressional polarization and political trust’, The Forum 13: 3, Oct. 2015, pp. 361–73. 
Figure 2: Partisan polarization and public trust in government, 1963–2017
Source: Partisan polarization (horizontal axis) is based on House data at https://voteview.com (see 





























0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90





























The end of the American century?
627
International Affairs 95: 3, 2019
instead on unilateral action and presidential directives.28 These same signature 
foreign policies have frequently attracted criticism from the party out of power. 
Predictably, this trend has been matched by the new tendency of incoming presi-
dents to undo their predecessors’ legacies upon entering office.29 George W. Bush 
withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol and opposed the Rome Statute. Barack Obama 
sought to end US involvement in Iraq. Donald Trump withdrew the United States 
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Paris Agreement on climate change 
and the Iran nuclear deal. These dramatic reversals are possible because policies 
undertaken without secure legislative underpinning can be undone with a stroke 
of a presidential pen. The net effect is to make US foreign policy commitments 
less reliable than they were when bipartisan legislative actions were the norm.30 
US relative power may not have changed much since the tail end of the Cold War 
era, but American pronouncements about how it will be used in the medium to 
long term, or about the conditions under which it will be used, are worth less on 
the international stage. The usability of US power is diminished.
Heresthetics and the mobilization of public opinion
Bipartisan coalitions in favour of ambitious foreign policies do not emerge auto-
matically in response to international exigencies.31 On the contrary, their construc-
tion and maintenance require both propitious domestic conditions and adroit 
political leadership. Among other things, consensus on programmatic foreign poli-
cies requires big animating ideas and compelling guiding principles to secure the 
support of those who might otherwise worry about potential costs in terms of 
executive power, national sovereignty or economic opportunity. Crucially, these 
ideas must be powerful enough to discourage political opponents from challenging 
the status quo, or to diminish the effectiveness of any attempt to do so. As William 
Riker argues, leaders can actively cultivate such domestic buy-in through the stra-
tegic manipulation of issues, or ‘heresthetics’.32 The introduction of a new policy 
alternative in the collective choice set can redefine the terms of debate, thereby 
28 This was especially true in the Obama administration, which implemented the Paris climate accord and Iran 
nuclear deal, among other policies, via executive action rather than treaty: see Schultz, ‘Perils of polarization’, 
p. 15. It is also true of President Trump’s so-called ‘Muslim ban’ and his executive order to construct a physi-
cal barrier along the southern border (which, although arguably a domestic policy, was framed in national 
security terms).
29 Treaty commitments are much more durable than executive agreements. See Julian Nyarko, ‘Giving the treaty 
a purpose: comparing the durability of treaties and executive agreements’, American Journal of International Law 
113: 1, 2018, pp. 54–89, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3133833.
30 The sweeping rejection of international treaties and agreements was rare in the Cold War era. Not a single 
treaty between the US and USSR—and not a single treaty obligation to a US ally—was overturned by an 
incoming US president during the Cold War, despite significant controversy over the terms of agreements 
such as the ABM Treaty and the two Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreements. Even SALT II, 
which was very unpopular among Republican hard-liners and was never considered by the Senate for fear 
that it would not be ratified, was honoured by the Reagan administration for a full five years despite Reagan’s 
condemnation of the SALT process during the 1980 election campaign.
31 Peter Trubowitz and Nicole Mellow, ‘Foreign policy, bipartisanship and the paradox of post-September 11 
America’, International Politics 48: 2–3, March 2011, pp. 164–87.
32 See Riker, The art of political manipulation. See also Ronald R. Krebs, Narrative and the making of US national 
security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
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improving the chances of outflanking opposition and building a winning coalition. 
Presidents use heresthetics to set the parameters of acceptable political debate 
among political elites, as well as to win over the hearts and minds of electors. At 
the elite level, heresthetics can thus be considered a form of agenda-setting power, 
a way of structuring the political conversation in ways that aim to deprive the 
opposition of potential allies and otherwise promising lines of attack.
Some presidents have been more successful than others at structuring the terms 
of foreign policy debate.33 Woodrow Wilson famously failed to secure domestic 
buy-in for his vision of a ‘society of nations’ that would guarantee national self-
determination, international economic openness, and peace and security for all 
nations. By not establishing sufficient support for overseas activism, Wilson opened 
the door to a Republican Party promising ‘normalcy’ over novelty. Franklin 
Roosevelt succeeded where Wilson failed. He fused Wilson’s communitarian 
vision of universal rights, free and open trade, and collective security with more 
familiar principles of Great Power politics (e.g. the balance of power and spheres 
of influence) and enhanced prosperity at home for industry and agriculture.34 
Roosevelt was thus able to secure the support of core Democratic constituencies 
in the manufacturing north-east and agricultural south while breaking the vice-
like grip that midwestern and western isolationists had held on the Republicans’ 
foreign policy platform.35 FDR defined the terms of the foreign policy debate in 
a way that won over key constituencies while forcing his political opponents into 
a minority position. He thus strengthened his hand in foreign policy-making.
In the years following the end of the Second World War, Harry Truman 
expanded America’s commitment to internationalism by creating new institutions 
to regulate the world economy and new military tools to keep the peace. At a 
time when conservatives controlled the purse strings in Congress, Truman framed 
the case for a more expansive (and expensive) American-led international order 
in terms of national security and anti-communism.36 Truman’s heresthetic move 
contributed to some forms of extremism (notably McCarthyism), but it did put 
internationalism on a firm bipartisan footing and gave his successors, Republican 
and Democratic alike, considerable latitude to advance internationalist causes.37 
To be sure, as historian John Lewis Gaddis points out, during the first decades 
33 On this dimension of foreign policy-making, see John Gerard Ruggie, ‘The past as prologue? Interests, iden-
tity, and American foreign policy’, International Security 21: 4, Spring 1997, pp. 89 –125.
34 Stephen Wertheim, ‘Instrumental internationalism: the American origins of the United Nations, 1940–3’, 
Journal of Contemporary History, publ. online Feb. 2019, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009419826661; Ruggie, 
‘The past as prologue?’, pp. 97–102; G. John Ikenberry, ‘The end of liberal international order?’, International 
Affairs 94: 1, Jan. 2018, pp. 7–23.
35 See Peter Trubowitz, Defining the national interest: conflict and change in American foreign policy (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 96–168.
36 See Fred Block, ‘Economic instability and military strength: the paradoxes of the 1950 rearmament decision’, 
Politics and Society 10: 1, Jan. 1980, pp. 35–58; Melvyn P. Leffler, A preponderance of power: national security, the 
Truman administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992). On the dramatic shift 
in ideas that accompanied America’s embrace of internationalism, see Jeffrey W. Legro, ‘Whence American 
internationalism?’, International Organization 54: 2, Spring 2000, pp. 253–89.
37 Meanwhile, potential critics of Truman’s strategy of ‘containment’, from Henry Wallace on the left to Robert 
Taft on the right, found it difficult to muster support lest they be viewed as ‘soft’ on communism and national 
security.
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of the Cold War Keynesian internationalists such as John Kennedy and Lyndon 
Johnson embraced this national security frame more fully than fiscally conserva-
tive internationalists such as Dwight Eisenhower.38 But it was not until the 1970s 
that isolationist pressures began to resurface. 
At that point, after two decades of consensus, political fissures over the purposes 
of American power opened up. Mounting social tensions triggered by the Vietnam 
War and the civil rights movement, and the rapidly diverging economic fortunes 
of, respectively, the older economies of the north-east and the rapidly growing 
south and west, made it difficult for America’s leaders to mobilize and sustain 
bipartisan support for an expansive internationalist agenda. In the 1970s, the resur-
gence of isolationism and nationalism led all three presidents—Richard Nixon, 
Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter—to look for ways to trim America’s international 
sails, not extend them. However, strategic retrenchment proved to be poorly 
suited as a heresthetic move to lock in the support of the dynamic ‘sunbelt’ states 
of the south and west. ‘Detente’ with the Soviet Union—perhaps the closest that 
Cold War era retrenchers came to a strategic vision—was never able to secure 
lasting support within the Republican Party, which increasingly dominated these 
regions of the country electorally, and supported more assertive and militarized 
foreign policy agendas.
In the 1980s Ronald Reagan reversed a decade of strategic retrenchment by seiz-
ing on the possibilities for coalition-building between west and south. He did so 
by grafting the Republicans’ longstanding commitment to anti-communism onto 
a ‘new’ foreign policy agenda that favoured liberalized trade, a strong national 
defence, and bolder, more assertive American leadership. Reagan called this ‘peace 
through strength’.39 By playing on these and other issues (such as racial tensions 
in the United States), Reagan was able to appeal to a broad swathe of the elec-
torate—in existing Republican heartlands in the midwest and west to be sure, 
but also in territory previously dominated by the Democratic Party (especially in 
the south). Though less transformative than Truman’s foreign policy heresthetic, 
Reagan’s would continue to shape debates over US foreign policy even after the 
Cold War ended. Reagan’s strategic offering made it difficult for Democrats and any 
Republican dissenters to launch successful attacks on his brand of internationalism. 
Presidents who succeeded in securing domestic buy-in for their foreign policy 
agendas were able to ‘expand the collective choice set’ by convincing voters that 
their preferred international policies would strengthen national security and 
increase economic opportunity. In Riker’s terms, those presidents succeeded in 
redefining the structural context of debate in ways that boosted domestic support 
for international engagement and made it harder for their political opponents 
to mount an effective campaign against it (by arguing for retrenchment, for 
38 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of containment: a critical appraisal of American national security policy during the Cold 
War, rev. edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005; first publ. 1982).
39 Thomas J. McCormick, America’s half century: United States foreign policy in the Cold War and after (Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995; first publ. 1989), pp. 216–36; Daniel Wirls, Buildup: the politics of 
defense in the Reagan era (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Reagan strategy of 
containment’, Political Science Quarterly 105: 3, Autumn 1990, pp. 373–95.
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example). They did so by taking some of the earlier arguments for retrenchment 
(e.g. that greater cooperation with Moscow would lead to less instability in the 
Third World; that the US could no longer sustain heavy defence expenditures) off 
the table. In the 1990s John Ruggie presciently warned that if US leaders could 
not make a similar case in the post-Cold War era, America’s commitment to inter-
nationalism would languish.40
This seems to be what happened over the course of the 1990s. In the absence of 
a ‘clear and present danger’ to national security, a ‘new apathy’ took hold.41 While 
most Americans remained attached to the core principles of internationalism, 
the intensity of that attachment waned dramatically. Meanwhile, for growing 
numbers of working- and middle-class Americans, protecting jobs had become 
the most important foreign policy issue.42 In the face of these new constraints, Bill 
Clinton sought to restructure the public debate in terms of globalization, which 
he linked to a ‘Third Way’ of expanding economic opportunity.43 Clinton empha-
sized his commitment to using foreign policy as a lever to expand the economic 
opportunities available to all Americans via the creation of new overseas trading 
relationships.44 The problem was that ever fewer Americans actually felt that 
globalization was serving their economic interests.45 
The attacks of 11 September 2001 allowed George W. Bush and the Republi-
cans to reframe the foreign policy debate in strictly national security terms. That 
the public viewed Republicans as stronger and more competent than Democrats 
on national security only made this narrative easier to frame and sell politically.46 
So did the fact that prevailing popular and media narratives had already identi-
fied international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion as serious threats to national security.47 However, as Jack Snyder, Robert 
40 Ruggie, ‘The past as prologue?’, p. 91.
41 James M. Lindsay, ‘The new apathy: how an uninterested public is reshaping foreign policy’, Foreign Affairs 
79: 5, Sept.–Oct. 2000, pp. 2–8.
42 Pew Research Center, America’s place in the world, Nov. 1993, http://www.people-press.org/1993/11/02/
americas-place-in-the-world/, and America’s place in the World II, Oct. 1997, http://www.people-press.
org/1997/10/10/americas-place-in-the-world-ii/.
43 Flavio Romano, Clinton and Blair: the political economy of the Third Way (New York: Routledge, 2006); James 
Shoch, Trading blows: trade policy and US trade policy in a globalizing era (Chapel Hill: University of North Caro-
lina Press, 2001), pp. 161–254.
44 Clinton’s was a highly activist foreign policy, and his commitment to expand the NATO alliance has led some 
analysts to classify his foreign policy as one of ‘primacy’. However, most treatments of Clinton stress his 
commitment to keeping costs in check and relying more heavily on foreign economic policy to promote US 
interests. See e.g. Stephen M. Walt, ‘Two cheers for Clinton’s foreign policy’, Foreign Affairs 79: 2, 2000, pp. 
63–79; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Second chance: three presidents and the crisis of American superpower (New York: Basic 
Books, 2007); Colin Dueck, Reluctant crusaders: power, culture, and change in American grand strategy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006).
45 As one careful analysis of public opinion at the time concluded: ‘There is substantial skepticism about whether 
the net effects of economic globalization are positive, with pluralities or majorities of US citizens opposing 
policies to further liberalize trade, immigration, and foreign investment.’ See Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew 
J. Slaughter, Globalization and the perception of American workers (Washington DC: Peterson Institute for Inter-
national Economics, 2000), p. 44.
46 This was certainly true at the beginning of the Bush presidency, but the Republican advantage in this regard 
weakened considerably in the wake of the invasion of Iraq. See Hannah Goble and Peter M. Holm, ‘Breaking 
bonds? The Iraq War and the loss of Republican dominance in national security’, Political Research Quarterly 
62: 2, Sept. 2008, pp. 215–29.
47 The Bush administration is a good example of how presidents can use international events to bolster a domes-
tic narrative, and how a compelling foreign policy narrative can allow them to control the domestic interpre-
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Shapiro and Yaeli Bloch-Elkon showed, the global ‘war on terrorism’ ultimately 
proved incapable of securing lasting domestic support for Bush’s foreign policy.48 
Especially as the US military effort in Iraq turned from a relatively successful 
invasion into a costly occupation and counter-insurgency operation, partisan 
divisions over the purposes of American power and the economic costs of power 
projection deepened, and public pressure to ‘do less internationally’ mounted. 
Initial bipartisan support for the war on terrorism dissipated. Public dissatisfaction 
with the administration’s handling of Iraq contributed to the Democrats’ triumph 
in the 2006 midterm elections and played an important role in the election of 
President Obama two years later.49 
By the time Barack Obama took office, America’s stock of ‘usable power’ 
was clearly limited by domestic dissension and ideological deficit.50 Pressure to 
pull back from using American power abroad intensified in the wake of the 2008 
economic collapse. In response, Obama pursued a strikingly different foreign 
policy heresthetic from that of his predecessor by reasserting American respect 
for international law and liberal values while reducing the costs of America’s 
military footprint. The first of these two themes found expression in Obama’s 
‘values as security’ speech of May 2009; the second was on display later that year 
in a West Point speech in which he declared that it was time for ‘nation-building 
here at home’.51 Despite early signs that he might succeed in reshaping public 
perceptions of American purpose, Obama’s heresthetic manoeuvre ultimately 
left many Americans frustrated and dissatisfied.52 Instead of rendering alternative 
strategies politically unviable, Obama’s foreign policy legacy offered his critics 
political ammunition with which to attack the administration for both weakness 
and overreach. By the end of Obama’s two terms in office, there was no shared 
vision of foreign policy purpose even within the Democratic Party.53
Figure 3 depicts responses over the period 1987–2017 to Pew’s public opinion 
survey questions on whether military strength is the best way to ensure peace. 
The widening of the partisan gap is stark. As the spike after 2002 suggests, Bush 
and Obama suffered from a common problem in the international arena: failure 
tation of the international environment. See Jon Western, ‘The war over Iraq: selling war to the American 
public’, Security Studies 14: 1, Jan. 2005, pp. 106–39; Ronald R. Krebs and Jennifer K. Lobasz, ‘Fixing the mean-
ing of 9/11: hegemony, coercion, and the road to war in Iraq’, Security Studies 16: 3, Aug. 2007, pp. 409–51.
48 Jack Snyder, Robert Y. Shapiro and Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, ‘Free hand abroad, divide and rule at home’, World 
Politics 61: 1, Jan. 2009, pp. 155–87.
49 Gary C. Jacobson, ‘Referendum: the 2006 midterm congressional elections’, Political Science Quarterly 122: 1, 
Spring 2007, pp. 1–24 at pp. 5–9.
50 On political dissension in the early Obama years, see Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz, ‘The illu-
sion of liberal internationalism’s revival’, International Security 35: 1, Summer 2010, pp. 95–109. For a nuanced 
discussion of Obama’s attitude towards US leadership and how this intersected with America’s hard power 
during the early years of his presidency, see Adam Quinn, ‘The art of declining politely: Obama’s prudent 
presidency and the waning of American power’, International Affairs 87: 4, 2011, pp. 803–24.
51 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Remarks by the President on national security’, 21 May 2009, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-national-security-5-21-09; The 
White House, ‘The new way forward’, 1 Dec. 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/12/01/
new-way-forward-presidents-address.
52 Richard C. Eichenberg, ‘Public opinion and foreign policy in the Obama era’, Politique Américaine 14: 2, Fall 
2009, pp. 11–14.
53 During the 2016 Democratic primaries, for example, both main candidates for the party’s nomination came 
out against ratification of the TPP, in a significant repudiation of Obama’s internationalist programme.
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to build a broad base of domestic support. After 9/11, Bush enjoyed some obvious 
success at mobilizing American power in the service of an expansionist foreign 
policy that clearly broke with both the Clinton and George H. W. Bush admin-
istrations. Yet over the long term, neither he nor Obama was able to close the 
ideological gap between Republicans and Democrats over how best to promote 
American interests internationally. Bush’s response to 9/11, including the Iraq 
War, might have rallied the Republican faithful to his side. But over time, the 
war alienated many voters.54 President Obama, too, could count on solid backing 
from his own party on most foreign policy issues—although not always for his 
free-trade agenda, as noted above. But his emphasis on diplomacy over military 
power attracted bitter criticism from across the aisle.55 Like Bush, Obama adopted 
an approach to foreign affairs that failed to reposition the existing line of cleavage 
in the domestic arena in such a way as to yield a stable bipartisan majority.56 Both 
54 Philip A. Klinkner, ‘Mr Bush’s war: foreign policy in the 2004 election’, Presidential Studies Quarterly 36: 2, June 
2006, pp. 281–96; Jeffrey M. Jones, ‘War through partisan lenses’, Gallup, 15 Nov. 2015, http://www.gallup.
com/poll/19924/war-through-partisan-lenses.aspx.
55 Pew Research Center, Public uncertain, divided over America’s place in the world, April 2016, http://www.people-
press.org/2016/05/05/public-uncertain-divided-over-americas-place-in-the-world/.
56 Polarization has not prevented presidents such as Bush or Obama from enacting legislation in support of 
their preferred foreign policies, but such domestic achievements are more vulnerable to being undone than 
bipartisan legislation would be. 
Figure 3: Ideological divide over ‘peace through strength’, 1987–2017
Note: The partisan gap (vertical axis) refers to the percentage difference between Republicans who 
agreed and Democrats who disagreed: the greater it is, the further apart Republicans and Democrats 
were on the question.
Source: Based on data from opinion surveys by Pew Research Center and, for 2005, German Marshall 
Fund. Data is available at the Roper Foundation Center for Public Opinion Research, https://www.
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presidents’ foreign policies ultimately proved to be electoral liabilities. Instead of 
cementing domestic support, their policies fuelled divisive electoral strategizing 
within both parties. This eroded their usable power in the foreign policy arena.
Redistribution, economic inclusiveness and foreign policy
As the experiences of Woodrow Wilson, George W. Bush and Barack Obama 
show, presidents cannot necessarily persuade domestic publics to back their 
preferred foreign policy agenda over the long term—even when external events 
would appear to lend credibility to domestic calls for international activism. One 
lesson to be drawn from this reflection is that voters’ support for ambitious inter-
national agendas must be self-reinforcing and resilient in the face of rival or alter-
native foreign policy frames. One common way of giving the public an enduring 
self-interested stake in ambitious international policies is by making sure the grand 
strategy pays economic dividends for average Americans—and, where it fails to do 
so, provides adequate social protections or compensatory measures.57 
For more than half a century, liberal internationalism served the interests of 
ordinary Americans by offering such opportunities and protections. But it is now 
conventional wisdom that growing numbers of Americans have lost faith in the 
idea that deeper international engagement means greater economic opportunity 
and security for them.58 As the progressive distributive pay-out of US foreign 
policy has diminished, due in part to the pursuit of neo-liberal policies both domes-
tically and internationally, the domestic bases of support for internationalism have 
narrowed.59 There is considerable evidence of this for the post-1990 period.60 
This era is not unique, however, and structural parallels with earlier eras lend 
support to the argument that the positive relationship between inclusive growth 
and public support for international engagement is a more generic phenomenon. 
The key point is that presidents must craft their international policies in ways 
that are perceived to serve a broad base of Americans instead of enriching narrow 
sectional, class or partisan interests. Otherwise, domestic actors may conclude that 
their self-interest is best served not through international openness and interde-
pendence, but through economic nationalism and political isolationism.61
57 The argument here draws on Peter Trubowitz, ‘Shared purpose: US foreign policy in an age of anxiety’, 
manuscript in progress.
58 Support for economic globalization has always been an elite-driven phenomenon, but economic openness has 
been at least tolerated by the broader electorate. See Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and Naná de Graaf, American 
grand strategy and corporate elite networks: the open door since the end of the Cold War (New York: Routledge, 2016). 
See also Inderjeet Parmar, ‘The US-led liberal order: imperialism by another name?’, International Affairs 94: 
1, Jan. 2018, pp. 151–72.
59 Ikenberry, ‘The end of liberal international order?’; Doug Stokes, ‘Trump, American hegemony and the 
future of the liberal international order’, International Affairs 94: 1, Jan. 2018, pp. 133–50.
60 See Brian B. Burgoon, Tim Oliver and Peter Trubowitz, ‘Globalization, domestic politics, and transatlan-
tic relations’, International Politics 54: 4, July 2017, pp. 420–33; Ronald Ingelhart and Pippa Norris, Trump, 
Brexit, and the rise of populism: economic have-nots and cultural backlash, working paper (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
Kennedy School, 19 July 2016); Dani Rodrik, ‘Populism and the economics of globalisation’, Journal of Inter-
national Business Policy 1: 1, June 2018, pp. 12–33.
61 Whether sectors of the domestic economy benefit from economic openness will depend upon their relation-
ship to the world economy and is largely out of the control of national governments. But presidents can 
pursue economic integration (or any other foreign economic policy) in ways that are more or less redistribu-
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Theodore Roosevelt’s ‘Square Deal’ and Franklin Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’ both 
linked grand strategic ambitions abroad to benefit-sharing policies at home. In 
the early twentieth century, Teddy Roosevelt broke with America’s longstanding 
tradition of self-isolation and set the country on an internationalist course, 
albeit one quite different from the liberal internationalism of the later twentieth 
century. He was in the White House at a time when the biggest threats to America 
emanated from the domestic rather than the international environment.62 In the 
face of deep social unrest over the uneven economic effects of rapid industrial-
ization, Roosevelt’s expansionist turn was coupled with a progressive agenda of 
economic and social reform designed, as he put it, ‘to subordinate the big corpora-
tions to the public welfare’.63 By putting government on the side of the common 
man, Roosevelt’s ‘Square Deal’ made it easier for workers and farmers to support 
his efforts to modernize the military, open foreign markets and extend the nation’s 
strategic reach.
Thirty years later, Franklin Roosevelt faced an even more daunting domestic 
challenge—the havoc unleashed by the Great Depression. Building on Teddy 
Roosevelt’s progressive-era efforts to put a brake on predatory business practices, 
FDR’s sweeping New Deal policies and programmes committed the federal 
government to guaranteeing the economic security of working Americans. By 
making that commitment, Roosevelt made it possible for America to embrace 
what James Kurth aptly called a ‘national project of international expansion’—the 
rise of a Pax Americana that rested on an interlocking network of international 
economic, political and military institutions led and dominated by the United 
States.64 Open trade, influxes of low-cost labour and extensive security commit-
ments worked for the United States, economically and strategically. For decades 
after the Second World War, tight labour markets, a corporate culture of civic 
responsibility, and a bipartisan commitment to progressive taxation, social protec-
tion and affordable education spread the benefits of internationalist policies and 
thus made such policies agreeable to a broad cross-section of Americans.65
FDR’s legacy meant that his successors, each intent on pursuing expansive 
foreign policies to a greater or lesser degree, could do so knowing that most sectors 
of the American economy stood to benefit from internationalism. Most lawmakers 
could vote in favour of internationalist foreign policies—military preparedness, 
free trade, foreign aid and so forth—safe in the knowledge that a preponderance 
of their domestic constituents would benefit from their actions.66 Yet even before 
tive and egalitarian. Only those policies that serve a broad base of interests will endure over the long term.
62 See Christopher McKnight Nichols, Promise and peril: America at the dawn of a global age (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2015).
63 Cited in Sidney M. Milkis and Michael Nelson, The American presidency: 1776–1998, 3rd edn (Washington DC: 
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1999), p. 198.
64 James Kurth, ‘American grand strategy: a pattern of history’, The National Interest, no. 43, 1996, pp. 3–19.
65 It is important to note that the benefits of international engagement were not universally distributed, however. 
As Ira Katznelson demonstrates, support for the New Deal and FDR’s liberal internationalist foreign policy 
was contingent on the preservation of racial segregation: Ira Katznelson, Fear itself: the New Deal and the origins 
of our time (New York: Norton, 2013). 
66 Meanwhile, Cold War fears of Soviet-style communism tempered whatever misgivings Americans still 
harboured about the domestic costs of greater international openness, interdependence and engagement.
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the Berlin Wall came down, support for internationalism had started to weaken. 
From the 1980s on, less regulation, lower taxes, de-unionization and higher profits 
for the few meant less economic security for the many.67 Meanwhile, for those 
expecting a ‘peace dividend’, the end of the Cold War brought no windfall. As a 
result, many of those who viewed themselves as losing out from elite-led inter-
nationalist policies would soon come to make harsh judgements about NAFTA, 
the WTO, other multilateral trade arrangements, and the broader contours of the 
globalized (American-led) world economic system.
The costs to working Americans of the neo-liberal agenda continued to mount 
in the 1990s and 2000s, even as the geopolitical rationale for bearing the burdens 
of global leadership became less compelling.68 Financialization and the expan-
sion of consumer debt helped buffer the negative impact on average Americans to 
some degree—until the 2008 financial crash. Yet for many middle- and working-
class Americans, globalization was no longer seen as a means to easy household 
credit, but rather as a source of growing income inequality, economic insecurity 
and social uncertainty. Many economists at the time insisted that the correla-
tion between globalization and inequality evident in figure 4 was simplistic and 
misleading.69 However, to ‘globalization’s losers’ the interrelationship was clear. 
This was not lost on Donald Trump or Bernie Sanders, both of whom stressed the 
link between globalization and inequality.70
Trump’s ‘America First’ and Bernie Sanders’s brand of economic populism 
appealed to voters who had soured towards globalization and were no longer 
convinced that Washington had their interests at heart.71 Many of those voters 
also wonder why their leaders are not insisting that wealthy democracies such 
as Germany and Japan put a larger share of their income towards collective 
defence,72 and why Congress has looked the other way as millions of factory 
workers have seen their jobs outsourced to China and other emerging econo-
67 Jacob S. Hacker, The great risk shift: the new economic insecurity and the decline of the American dream, rev. edn (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008). Such neo-liberal reforms cut against the ‘embedded liberal’ compro-
mise that defined the postwar economic order. See John Gerard Ruggie, ‘International regimes, transactions, 
and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order’, International Organization 36: 2, Spring 1982, 
pp. 379–415.
68 Carla Norrlof, ‘Hegemony and inequality: Trump and the liberal playbook’, International Affairs 94: 1, Jan. 
2018, pp. 63–88.
69 Economists disagree about the importance of globalization in explaining inequality within (and between) 
countries. See e.g. Martin Ravallion, ‘Inequality and globalization: a review essay’, Journal of Economic Litera-
ture 56: 2, 2018, pp. 620–42.
70 See Donald Trump, ‘Declaring America’s economic independence’, 28 June 2016, https://www.politico.com/
story/2016/06/full-transcript-trump-job-plan-speech-224891; Bernie Sanders, ‘Democrats need to wake up’, 
New York Times, 28 June 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/29/opinion/campaign-stops/bernie-sand-
ers-democrats-need-to-wake-up.html. 
71 By the time of the 2016 election, conditions were ripe for political candidates to capitalize on these sentiments. 
It is not that economic inequality did not matter in previous election cycles, just that it mattered differently in 
2016. See Diana C. Mutz, ‘Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote’, Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences 115: 19, May 2018, pp. E4330–E4339.
72 William Jordan, ‘Could NATO be a wedge issue in 2016?’, Economist/YouGov, 21 July 2016, https://today.
yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2016/07/21/nato-could-be-wedge-issue-2016. On public support 
for Germany taking on more ‘strategic responsibilities’, see Pew Research Center, Germany and the United 
States: reliable allies but disagreement on Russia, global leadership, and trade, 7 May 2015, http://www.pewglobal.
org/2015/05/07/germany-and-the-united-states-reliable-allies/.
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mies.73 Many wonder, too, why the two parties cannot find common ground 
on a new immigration policy, and blame the immigration status quo for driving 
down wages for low-skilled labour in the service sector and some trades, and for 
straining social services, especially for those on low and middle rungs of the socio-
economic ladder.74
Whether or not these perceptions match economic reality, the links between 
declining middle- and working-class fortunes, on the one hand, and the erosion of 
US ‘usable power’, on the other hand, are clear. Why should ordinary Americans 
be expected to support their tax dollars being used to underwrite an interna-
tional architecture they no longer view as being in their economic self-interest? 
And why would elected representatives support internationalist foreign policies 
73 See David H. Autor, David Dorn and Gordon H. Hanson, The China shock: learning from labor market adjustment 
to large changes in trade, working paper 21906 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Jan. 
2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21906.
74 Research suggests that Americans’ personal economic fortunes significantly influence their attitudes on immi-
gration. See Judith L. Goldstein and Margaret E. Peters, ‘Nativism or economic threat: attitudes toward 
immigrants during the Great Recession’, International Interactions 40: 3, April 2014, pp. 376–401; Kenneth F. 
Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter, ‘Labor market competition and individual preferences over immigration 
policy’, Review of Economics and Statistics 83: 1, Feb. 2001, pp. 133–45.
Figure 4: Globalization and inequality in the US, 1969–2015
Notes: Economic globalization refers to trade and financial flows across borders. See Axel Dreher, 
‘Does globalization affect growth? Evidence from a new index of globalization’, Applied Economics 
38: 10, 2006, pp. 1091–110; Savina Gygli, Florian Haelg and Jan-Egbert Sturm, The KOF Globaliza-
tion Index – revisited, KOF working paper no. 439 (Zurich, 2018), http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/.  
Source: Economic globalization based on KOF (Swiss Economic Institute) Index of Globalization at 
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/. Income inequality data are from Emmanuel Saez, Striking it richer: 
















































The end of the American century?
637
International Affairs 95: 3, 2019
that are likely to invite punishment from unhappy constituents? In the absence 
of a clear, convincing and comprehensive domestic pay-off, internationalism has 
become highly charged and politicized.75 Once a unifying, common endeavour 
that bound the public and the political class together, internationalism is now an 
electoral liability for increasing numbers of lawmakers. That Donald Trump was 
able to win the presidency in November 2016 on an avowedly anti-internationalist 
platform is evidence enough that large numbers of Americans now believe that 
economic protectionism is a viable pathway to national prosperity, and that inter-
national leadership has become a cause of the country’s economic troubles instead 
of a solution to them.76
Conclusions: retrenchment or renewal?
In the case of the United States, international leadership depends crucially on a 
president’s ability to build and maintain domestic political support. This is true 
no matter what sort of international agenda a president wishes to pursue; but it is 
especially true of grand strategies such as liberal internationalism that require huge 
investments of national resources. Today, public confidence in deep international 
engagement (and the leaders who advocate it) has demonstrably weakened in the 
absence of bipartisanship, a compelling foreign policy narrative and economic 
inclusiveness. The result is that America’s usable power will continue to languish 
even if the United States retains its position as the world’s predominant power. 
This is a crucial point often missed in the contemporary debates about what the 
future of US foreign policy should be.
The issues raised here are pressing ones. Although America’s usable power 
was already highly constricted when Trump was elected, it seems to have eroded 
further since then. Under Trump, partisanship in Washington has increased, not 
decreased.77 And while his ‘America First’ narrative might have tapped into a 
widespread feeling that the United States is in decline vis-à-vis its rivals, its heres-
thetical value is limited; there is little realistic chance that Trump’s vision will 
bridge the chasms that separate Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and 
liberals, internationalists and nationalists.78 Trump’s harsh stance on immigration 
has proved to be very unpopular with the majority of voters, even if it strongly 
appeals to his base.79 His embrace of protectionism and economic nationalism is 
75 Jeff D. Colgan and Robert O. Keohane, ‘The liberal order is rigged: fix it now or watch it wither’, Foreign 
Affairs 96: 3, May–June 2017, pp. 36–44.
76 We are not suggesting that foreign policy was the most important factor in Trump’s election. However, it is 
clear that his policies on trade, in particular, did contribute to his (narrow) victories in states such as Wisconsin, 
Michigan and Pennsylvania, and thus to his overall victory in the electoral college. According to one analysis, 
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more popular, but its contribution to economic inclusiveness is limited: Trump’s 
most fervent supporters are the ones most likely to bear the brunt of protectionist 
policies. Indeed, none of President Trump’s domestic policies appear designed to 
build inclusive support for a coherent foreign policy agenda.
Can the US put its foreign policy house in order? Realists argue that the best 
way to restore solvency to US foreign policy is to bring international commit-
ments back into line with what domestic politics will allow. They blame interna-
tionalism’s failures on the strategy itself, arguing that a leaner and more selective 
foreign policy such as retrenchment or ‘offshore balancing’ would be less risky and 
more cost-effective. Internationalists counter by arguing that such strategies are 
neither safer nor cheaper, and risk throwing the baby out with the bathwater.80 
They argue that America’s alliances and forward presence in Europe, Asia and the 
Middle East reduce the danger of Great Power competition and are cheaper to 
maintain than to rebuild once dismantled.
What analysts on both sides of this critical debate about America’s role in the 
world miss is that the decline in the efficacy of the country’s foreign policy has 
deep roots in domestic politics. Attacking the problem solely from the inter-
national side, either by sharpening commitments or by shedding them, will 
not restore America’s domestic capacity to balance ends and means. Realists, for 
example, may be right in insisting that Washington should engage more selec-
tively internationally. But retrenchment will not reduce the level of partisanship 
or the level of public frustration over job displacement and income loss caused by 
globalization and trade liberalization. As such, retrenchment would fail to ensure 
that the United States could muster enough usable power to sustain even the 
circumscribed set of international commitments that realists advocate.
From the perspective of all who wish to see the United States capable of acting 
in a more programmatic fashion—liberal internationalists, offshore balancers, even 
advocates of ‘America First’—a better approach is to build a case for a foreign 
policy on the basis of a renewed social contract. Such a contract would connect 
achievements in the foreign policy realm to recognizable benefits for a broad cross-
section of Americans. This would require political leaders to be explicit about the 
short- and long-term distributional consequences of their preferred international 
strategy for different domestic sectors and groups. This was less essential when 
middle- and working-class Americans had confidence in Washington, there was a 
credible connection between America’s international purpose and its power, and 
the economic benefits of international engagement outweighed the costs. One of 
the principal lessons of Donald Trump’s unexpected victory in 2016 is that those 
days are over.
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Our analysis suggests that ignoring the problem of domestic politics will only 
further erode America’s ability to act decisively in foreign affairs. Moreover, it 
would be wrong-headed to assume that a domestic coalition in favour of interna-
tional activism will surface in automatic response to a serious international threat 
such as the emergence of an aggressive peer competitor. Restoring America’s usable 
power will require political spadework on the home front: bipartisan bridge-
building, an inclusive political vision to connect national priorities with foreign 
policy, and a sustained commitment to more equitable redistributive policies. This 
will be a tall order, to be sure; but presidents have successfully navigated such 
troubled waters in the past. 

